ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

There is, in my judgment, evidence enough, under the circumstances, to establish the fact against the denial of it by the
defendants as to the $60,000, and to make it highly probable as
to the remaining $30,000.
On the whole, I think that the plaintiff should be allowed to
recover the sum claimed by the petition as due January 1862,
and January and July 1863, and January 1864, to the amount
of $60,000. And as to the amount claimed as due July 1864
and January 1865 ($30,000), he may recover that on giving
defendants good security, to be approved by the court, to save
them harmless from all persons hereafter to claim to recover the
same.
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Construction.- The defendant executed the following agreement,
dated New York, October 8th 1863 : "For value received the bearer
may call on me for one thousand shares of the stock of the Cleveland
and Pittsburgh Railroad Company, at one hundred and seventeen per
cent., any time in six months from date, without interest. The bearer
is entitled to all the dividends declared during the time to half past one
P. M. each day." Held, that the holder of the contract was not entitled
to a dividend which had been declared and announced previous to the
date of the contract; although at the time of its execution the stock
was selling "dividend on": Lombardo v. Case, 45 Barb.
BANKERS.
Measure of Damages in Action for Negligence in not presenting a
Note for paIment at its maturity.-In an action against bankers to

recover damages for omitting to present a note for payment at maturity,
and to charge the indorser, the judge left it to the jury to find so much

1To appear in 3 Wallace's Reports.
2 From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 10 of his Reports.
3
From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 45 of his Reports.
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damages as they would consider such a claim to be worth against ,9such
a man as the indorser was shown to be." Reid erroneous; and that the
charge should have had reference to the pecuniary means of the indorser: Bridge v. .Mason, 45 Barb.
Reld, also, that the amount of the note was primd facie the rule of

damages. But that the defendants could show, in mitigation of damages,
that the indorser was insolvent, or not worth property enough to pay the
debt; and that if this was shown, the defendants were entitled to a
verdict: Id.
-Insuch an action the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such damages
only as they have sustained, having reference to the amount of property
which it shall appear from the evidence that the indorser was possessed
of as owner: .d.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Notes given for illegal Consideration.-Promissory notes given for a
balance found due on settlement in a transaction itself forbidden by
statute and illegal, or for money lent to enable a party to pay bills which
the person taking the promissory notes had himself assisted, in violation
of statute, to issue and circulate, cannot be enforced: Brown v. Tarkington, 3 Wall.

The fact that such promissory notes are given for a balance found
due, or to enable a principal party in the illegal transaction to pay notes
that have got into public circulation and are unpaid, does not purge
them from the infirmity which belonged to the original vicious transaction: Id.
Where a deposition, after a motion on grounds set forth has been
unsuccessfully made at one term to suppress it, as irregularly taken, is
at another read on trial without objection or exception, it cannot be
objected to here on the grounds that were made for its suppression, or
at all: Id.
BRoKERs.
Sales for their own Account subject to Duty.-Under the Internal

Revenue Act of June 30th 1864, as amended by the Act of March 3d
1865, the sales of stocks, bonds, and securities made by brokers for
themselves are subject to the same duties as those made by them for
others: United States v. Cutting, 8 Wall.
Sales by Bankers for their own Account not subject to Duties.--

"Bankers" who sell the Federal securities no otherwise than for the
United States and for themselves, and who therefore do not sell them
for others or for a commission, are not liable to pay the duties imposed
by the 99th section of the Inrnal Revenue Act, of June 30th 1864,
imposed upon "brokers and bankers doing business as brokers:" United
States v. Fisk, 3 Wall.
COMMON CARan.
Limitation of Liability by Special Contract.-The common-law liability of a common carrier for the safe carriage of goods may be limited
and qualified by special contract with the owner; provided such soecial
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by negligence or misconduct:
contract do not attempt to cover losses
3 Wall.
York Company v. Central 1Pailroad,
Thus where a contract for the transportation of cotton from Memphis
to Boston was in the form of a bill of lading containing a clause exempting the carrier from liability for losses by fire, and the cotton was
destroyed by fire, the exemption was held sufficient to protect the carrier,
the fire not having been occasioned by any want of due care dn his
part : Id.
Damagesfor injury to Cattle in transporting.-In an action against
a carrier to recover damages for injuries sustained by a lot of cattle
received for transportation, through the negligence of the carrier or its
employees, the rule of damages is the difference in value between the
cattle when placed in the carrier's charge and their condition when
delivered: Black v. The Camden and Amboy Railroad and Trans.
Co., 45 Barb.
CoNsTrfuTioNAL LAW.
Contract valid according to the Law of a State when made, cannot be
Vmaired by subsequent onstruction of the Law by the ,Stati Courts.e case of Gelpcke v. The City of Dubugue (1 Wallace 175) affirmed
and enforced; and the doctrine reasserted that if a contract, when made,
was valid by the constitution and laws of a state, as then expounded by
the highest authorities whose duty it was to -administer them, no subsequent action by the legislature or judiciary can impair its obligation:
Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall.
Where the judges of the Circuit Court certify a division of opinion
to this court for its judgment, this court will not return an answer
unless the question raised involve a distinct legal point, and sufficient
facts are set forth to show its bearing on the rights of the parties.
Hence no answer. will be given to a proposition merely abstract: Id.
COURTS.
Suit in State Court against Offer of United States Court for Acts
done under authority of Process from the latter.-A suit prosecuted in
the state courts to the highest court of such state, against a marshal of
the United States for trespass, who defends himself on the ground that
the acts complained of were performed by him under a writ of attachment from the proper Federal court, presents a case for a writ of error
under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, when the final decisioi of
the state courts is against the validity of the authority thus set up by
the marshal: Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall.
The case of Freeman v. 11owe, 24 How. 450, an action of replevin,
decided that property held by the marshal under a writ from the Federal
court, could not be lawfully taken from his possession by any process
issuing i-om a state court; and decided nothing more: Id.
The ground of that decision was that the possession of the marshal
was the possession of the court, and that pending the litigation, no other
court of merely concurrent jurisdiction could be permitted to disturb

that possession: Id.

An action of trespass, for taking goods, does not come within th9
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principle of that case, inasmuch as it does not seek to interfere with the
possession of the property attached; but it involves the question, not
raised in that case, of the extent to which the Federal courts will protect their officers in the execution of their processes: Id.
With reference to this question, all writs and processes of the courts
may be divided into two classes: 1. Those which point out specifically
the property or thing to be seized. 2. Those which command the officer
to make or levy certain sums of money out of property of a party
named: Id.
In the.first class the officer has no discretion but must do precisely
what he is commanded. Therefore if the court had jurisdiction to issue
the writ, it is a protection to the officer in all courts: Id.
But in the second class the officer must determine for himself whether
the property which he proposes to seize under the process, is legally
liable to be so taken, and the court can afford him no protection against
the consequences of an erroneous exercise of his judgment in that
determination. He is liable to suit for injuries growing out of such
mistakes in any court of competent jurisdiction: Id.
A plea, therefore, which does not deny that the property seized was
the property of the plaintiff, or aver that it was liable to the writ under
which it was seized, is bad in any court: Id.
The rule that among courts of concurrent jurisdiction, that one which
first obtains jurisdiction of a case has the exclusive right to decide every
uestion arising in the case, is subject to some limitations; and is conned to suits between the same parties or privies seeking the same relief
or remedy, and to such questiohs or propositions as arise ordinarily and
properly in the progress of the suit first broughtk and does not extend
to all matters which may by possibility become involved in it: .d.
F RUD.
Evidence of.-In an action to set aside as fraudulent and void as
*nst creditors, a sale of merchandise made by S. & Co., in August
1 the judge admitted evidence of an assignment made by S. to his
son, in May 1861, and of the consideration therefor, and the manner of
payment. Held, that the assignment having occurred after the embarrassments of S. & Co. commenced, and appearing to be a part of the
general plan of S. to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors,
upon execution, the inquiry was clearly within the rule in respect to evidence of contemporaneous frauds: Angrave v. Stone et al., 45 Barb.
GnT.
Necessity of Delivery.-It is essential to a valid gift by parol that
there should be an actual or symbolical delivery. The title does not pass
unless possession, or the means of obtaining it, are conferred by the
donor and accepted by the donee: Gboper v. Burr et al., 45 Barb.
Evidence of Intent.-The situation, station, and circumstances of the
parties, and of the subject of the gift, may be taken into consideration
in determining the intent to give and the fact as to delivery: Id.
A total exclusion of the power or means of resuming possession by the
donor is not necessary: Id.
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C., who had been confined to her room by illness for nineteen or twenty
years, and to her bed for five or six years prior to her death, kept in her
room a bureau and trunks containing gold and silver coin and jewelry.
About six weeks before her decease, handing to the plaintiff, who had
lived with and taken care of her for twenty-seven years, the keys of the
bureau and trunks, she said, ,1Mary, here are these keys; I give them
to you; they are the keys of my trunks and bureau; take them and keep
them, and take good care of them; all my property and everything I
give to you; you have been a good girl to me, and be so still; * * *
you know I have given it all, to you; take whatever you please; it
is all yours, but take good care of it." Bld,that the lafiguage of the
donor, accompanied by a delivery of the keys of the trunks and bureau,
evinced the intention of the donor, and placed the donee in possession
of the means of assuming absolute control of the contents at her pleasure,
and constituted a valid gift of the coin and jewelry in the trunks and
bureau : Id.
Rled, also, that the fact that the trunks and bureau, or their contents,
were not removed, or even handled by the donee, was not a controlling
consideration: -1d.
INSURANCE.
Construction of Mlarine PoiZ.-A policy of insurance on a vessel
from ,New York to ports in South America and thence to ports of discharge in the United States, with an indorsement thereon of "liberty to
deviate by going to port or ports in Europe, by paying an equitable premium therefor," covers one round voyage; but does not include a distinct
and independent voyage, having no connection with the general objects
and purposes of the voyage insured; and in an action upon such a policy
evidence is inadmissible to show a usage among commercial men and
underwriters which permitted the making of intermediate voyages
between the ports of Europe, under the protection of such deviation
clause; or a usage, upon which policies have been issued and paid, and
which gave to the language of sich deviation clause a peculiar and
technical sense, namely, the signification of the liberty to make such
intermediate voyages; or a usage of trade and commerce by which American vessels at Constantinople, seeking return cargo from Smyrna or
other Mediterranean port, in the interval between the discharge of the
outward cargo and the season for obtaining cargo therefrom, make intermediate voyages; or to control the legal meaning of such deviation
clauses by proof of conversation, at the time it was written, between the
underwriters and the assured: Seccomb and Another v. Provincial
Insurance Company, 10 Allen.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.

The Law of Blockade and Rights of Neutral CJommerce.-No trade
honestly carried on between neutral ports, whether of the same or of different nations, can be lawfully interrupted by belligerents; but good
faith must preside over such commerce; enemy commerce under neutral
disguises has no claim to neutral immunity: The Bermuda, Wall.
Neutrals may establish themselves, for the purposes of trade, in ports
convenient to either belligerent; and may sell or transport to eithcr such
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articles as either may wish to buy, subject to risks of capture for violation of blockade or for the conveyance of contraband to belgerent
ports: Id.
Goods of every description may be conveyed to neutral ports from
neutral ports, if intended for actual discharge at a neutral port, and to
be brought into the common stock of merchandise of such port; but
voyages from neutral ports intended for belligerent ports are not protected in respect to seizure either of ship or cargo by an intention, real
or pretended, to touch at intermediate neutral ports: Id.
Neutrals may convey to belligerent ports, not under blockade, whatever
belligerents may desire to take, except contraband of war, which is
always subject to seizure when being conveyed to a belligerent destination, whether the voyage be direct or indirect; such seizure, however,
is restricted to actual contraband, and does not extend to the ship or
other cargo, except in cases of fraud or bad faith on the part of the
owners or of the master with the sanction of the owners: Id.
Vessels conveying contraband cargo to belligerent ports not under
blockade, under circumstances of fraud or bad faith, or cargo of any
description to belligerent ports under blockade, are liable to seizure and
condemnation from the commencement to the end of the voyage: .d.
A voyage from a neutral, to a belligerent port is one and the same
voyage, whether the destination be ulterior or direct, and whether with
or without the interposition of one or more intermediate ports; and
whether to be performed by one vessel or several employed in the same
transaction and in the accomplishment of the same purpose: Id.
Destination alone justifies seizure and condemnation of ship and cargo
in voyage to ports under blockade; and such destination justifies equally
seizure of contraband in voyage to ports not under blockade; but, in the
last case, ship and cargo not contraband are free from seizure except in
cases of fraud or bad faith: Id.
Circumstances, such as selection of master, control in lading and destination, instructions for conduct of voyage, and other like acts of ownership by an enemy, may repel, in the absence of charter-party or other
explanation, presumptions of ownership in a neutral arising from registry or other documents, and will warrant condemnation of a ship captured
in the employment of enemies as enemy property: Id.
Spoliation of papers, at the time of capture, under instructions and
without explanation by production of the instructions, or otherwise, warrants the most unfavorable inferences as to employment, destination, and
ownership of the captured vessel: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Tenant not allowed to dispute Landlord's Title.-One who has acknowledged the right of another, to premises, and made an agreement
with him for the occupation thereof by himself as tenant, for a limited
period, cannot dispute his landlord's title by setting up an outstanding
title held by himself, of which the landlord had no notice: The People
ez rel. ,Stover v. Stiner et al., 45 Barb.
LEASE.
lnrecorded Lease-VYalidity of Sub-lease.-If a lease is invalid, as
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against subsequent conveyances, for want of being recorded, a sub-lease
of the same premises will also be of no validity: The People ex rel.
Stover v. Stiner et al., 45 Barb.
LICENSE.

Under United States Laws does not take away Necessity of complying
with State Law.-A license granted by the United States, under the
Internal Revenue Act of July 1st 1862, to carry on the business of a
wholesale liquor dealer, in a particular state named, does not, although
it have been granted in consideration of a fee paid, give the licensee
power to carry on the business in violation of the state laws forbidding
such business to be carried on within its limits: McGuire v. The Commonwealth, 3 WalL
The payment of a license fee and a tax to the United States under the
Internal Revenue Acts does not authorize the sale of intoxicating liquors
in this commonwealth ifi violation of the laws of this commonwealth:
(Commonwealthv. .olbrook, 10 Allen.
LIEN UPON VESSELS.

Where the master of a vessel is sailing her under an agreement
between him and the owner, by which he, the master, is to sail her "on
shares," paying all bills for wages of officers and crew, and furnishing
provisions, and as "wages for himself," receiving one-half of the gross
amount of freight, the knowledge of the existence of such a contract,
by persons furnishing supplies for the use of the vessel, on the order of
the master, will not import an exclusive credit to the master, or prevent
the enforcement of a lien upon the vessel for such supplies: Vose et al.
v. Cockrof et al., 45 Barb.
Such an agreement between the owner of a vessel and the master,
being only for the mode of compensating the master, does not release
the vessel from the ordinary liability for supplies: Id.
MORTGAGE.
Surplus Honeys from Sale of MortgagedLand, under Foreclosure.The surplus moneys arising on a sale of land under a mortgage foreclosure, stand in the place of the land, in respect to those having liens
or vested rights therein, and the widow of the owner of the equity of
redemption is entitled to dower in the surplus, as she was in the land
before the sale: Matthews v. Duryee et al., 45 Barb.
Where the widow of a mortgagor is made a party defendant in a foreclosure suit, but omits to appear or assert her claim for dower, she is not
barred of her action for her share of the surplus moneys by any order
for their distribution made in the foreclosure suit: Id.
Nor is she barred from bringing such an action against the person to
whom the surplus moneys were assigned in the foreclosure suit by reason
of her neglect or omission to assert her claim, on being made a party to
a suit brought by that person, for the settlement and closing of his trust
as assignee of the mortgagor: Id.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Railroad Bonds and Coupons issuedfor Sabscrtions to. Railroads,
&c.-The general doctrines of this court, as settled by various recent
decisions, on the subject of railroad bonds issued by municipal corpora.
tions to "bearer," and which have passed into the hands of bondjfe
holders for value,-afflirmed and acted on; in the following points
decided :
A county, or other municipal corporation, has no inherent right of
legislation, and cannot subscribe for stock in a public improvement,
unless authorized to do so by the legislature. But the legislature of a
state, unless restrained by the organic law, has the right to authorize a
municipal corporation to take stock in a.railroad or other work of internal
improvement, to borrow money to pay for it, and to levy a tax to repay
the loan. And this authority can be conferred in such a manner that
the objects can be attained either with or without the sanction of the
popular vote: Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall.
If the courts of a state have when an agreement is made onstrued
their constitution and laws so as to give the agreement force and vitality,
the same courts cannot, by a subsequent and contrary construction,
render it invalid: Id.
Jf the legislature possess the power to authorize an act to be done, it
can by a retrospective act cure the evils which existed, because the power
thus conferred has been irregularlyexecuted: Id.
Bonds with coupons, payable to bearer, are negotiable securities, and
pass by delivery; and, in fact, have all the qualities and incidents of
commercial paper: Id.
If coupons to bonds are drawn so that they can be separated from the
bonds, and like the bonds, are negotiable, the owner of them can sue
on the coupons without producing the bonds to which they were attached,
or without being interested in them: Id.
Cty Railroads.&-The common council of the city of New York baa
no power to authorize an extension of a city railroad, unless possibly
where such extension is really necessary to the enjoyment of a previous
valid grant: The People v. The Third Avenue Railroad Company,
45 Barb.
Where a judge has found that the extension of a railroad is a public
nuisance, that alone, on a trial, entitles the plaintiffs to relief by injunc.
tion, although no damage be shown: .d.
If the necessity of the extension is not established the extension is
unlawful. It is then the attempted exercise by the company of a
valuable franchise not authorized by law. This, independently of any
other consideration or proof, is a sufficient damage to uphold a decree for
a perpetual injunction : Id.
Ditty to keep Travelled Way, whether public or private, in a sa/ft con.
dition for Travel.-If a travelled way, either public or private, over lots
adjoining a public street in a city and leading into that street, for a long
time before and after the existence of an excavation in the stieet, has
been so much used by persons having occasion to pass as to become known
as a common way for travel, and to make it reasonably necessary for the
city, in the exercise of due and proper care, to provide a barrier for the
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purpose of preventing travellers, who pass over such way from the
adjacent lots into the street, and use due care from falling into the excavation, and the city have unreasonably omitted to erect such barrier, they
are guilty of negligence, and are liable for an injury happening to a traveller
in the street by reason thereof: Burnham v. City of Boston, 10 Allen.
NmE.
Change of .Tame during lnfancy.-Where it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff, suing as Mary Cooper, was called Mary Flood
during her early infancy, bat that she had been called Mary Cooper by
C., with whom she lived, and whose name she took, and by all her
acquaintances, since about the age of nine or ten years, a period of about
twenty years: edd, that the action was properly brought by the plaintiff by the name of Mary Cooper; that being the name by which she was
generally known: Coope v. Burr et al., 45 Barb.
NEGLIGENCE.
Itijury to Passenger on Railroad.-A railroad corporation is not
responsible to a person employed by it to repair its cars, for a personal
injury arising from the negligence of a switchman, in failing properly to
adjust a switch upon the track over which he is carried by the corporation, free of charge, between his home and the place of his work, proprovided the corporation has used due care in the selection of the switchman; buit if the switchman was an habitual drunkard, and this fact was
known or ought to have been known to the corporation, and the injury
resulted from his intoxication, the corporation is responsible: Gilman
V. Railroad Corporation,10 Allen.
ContributoryNegligence of Plaintiff.-One who is injured by falling
through a trap-door in a portion of a factory which is not open to the
public, but is intended exclusively for workmen, and where the owner
had held out no invitation or allurement, express or implied, for him to
enter, cannot recover damages therefor against the owner of the factory:
Zoebisacl v. Tarbell and another, 10 Allen.
Duty to keep a Private Waj in safe condition.-If there are two
.entrances to a store, and there is a trap-door between one of them and
the stairs leading to the upper stories, which are verbally leased to a
tenant with permission to use such entrance, the owners, who occupy
the lower stories, are bound to use the trap-door with reference to the
safety of those who have a right to pass there; and if they neglect to
,exercise suitable and reasonable precautions to guard against accident
while the trap-door is open, they may be held liable in damages to a
.person having lawful occasion to pass to the upper rooms, who, while in
the use of due care, falls -through the trap-door and sustains injury by
reason of their negligence: Elliott v. Pray et al., 10 Allen.
If the owners of a store, which is situated upon a public street, have
let the upper stories thereof to a tenant, and an entrance, directly in
front of the stairs which lead to the upper stories, is so constructed and
is so habitually kept open as to indicate that it is a proper entrance
for those who have occasion to ascend the stairs, and there is a trap-door
between it and the stairs, which is carelessly left open by them, they
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may be held liable in damages to one who, while in the use of due care,
and having lawful occasion to ascend the stairs, is thereby induced topass through that entrance, and falls through the trap-door and sustains
injury by reason of their negligence: Id.
Passenger leaving a Train improperly.-If a railroad train is stopped
at night merely for the purpose of allowing a train which is expected
from the opposite direction to pass by, and no notice is given by the servants of the company to passengers that they may leave the ears, one
who leaves the cars and walks into an open cattle-guard and receives a
personal injury cannot maintain an action against the company to recover
damages therefor; and it is immaterial that he was misinformed by some
person not in the employment of the company that he must go and see
to having his baggage passed at a custom-house supposed to have beenreached by the train, or that the train was near a passenger station,
which was not the place of his destination: Frostv. Grand Trunk Railroad Company, 10 Allen.
Railroad Crossing-FlagSignal of Safety.If a railroad company
have made a private crossing over their track, at grade, in a city, and
allowed the public to use it as a highway, and stationed a flagman there
to prevent persons from undertaking to cross when there is danger, they
may be held liable in damages to one who, using due care, is induced to
undertake to cross by a signal from the flagman that it is safe, and is
injured by a collision which occurs through the flagman's carelessness:
Sweeney v. Old Colony and Newport Railroad Company, 10 Allen.
PRACTICE.
Order of Testimony-It is no error to admit testimony, irrelevant at
the time, if it is afterwards made pertinent by other testimony: Black
v. The Camden and Amboy Railroad and Transportation Company,
45 Barb.
Leading Question.-Whether or not a leading question may be put to
a witness, is a matter of discretion with the judge at the trial; and the
allowance of a leading question has ceased to be considered a matter to
be reviewed on appeal: Id.
Interest.-In actions ex delicto it is in the discretion of the jury
whether to allow interest by way of damages or not: Id. •
And when the jury are instructed, in an action for negligence, to
award the damages the plaintiff has sustained, the court may leave it to
them to say whether on such damages the plaintiff is entitled to interest;
but it is erroneous to instruct them, as matter of law, that the plaintiff
is entitled to interest on the damages: Id.
Trial.-If the judge in the trial of a civil case, at the request of the
jury, and without the knowledge of the parties, allows them to have a
copy of the General Statutes in the jury-room, while deliberating on
their verdict, their verdict will be set aside: Merri7l v. Nary, 10 Allen.
PRIZE.
Probable Cause.-Prizecourts properly deny damages or costs where
there has been "probable cause" for seizure: The Thompson, 3 Wall
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Probable cause exists where there are circumstances sufficient to war.
rant suspicion, even though not sufficient to warrant condemnation : id.
These principles applied to a case before the court where a captured
vessel was restored, but without costs or damages: Id.
Presumptionof Intent to run Blockade.-Presumptionof an intent to
run a blockade by a vessel bound apparently to a lawful port, may be inferred from a combination of circumstances, as ex. gr. the suspicious
character of the supercargo; the suspicious character of the master, left
unexplained, though the case was open for further proof; the fact that
the vessel, on her outward voyage, was in the neighborhood of the blockaded place, and within the line of the blockading vessels, by night, and
that her return voyage was apparently timed so as to be there by night
again; that the vessel (though in a leaking condition that condition
having been known to the master before he set sail) paid no attention to
guns fired to bring her to, but, on the contrary, crowded on more sail and
ran for the blockaded shore; and that one witness testified in preparatorio that the master, just before the capture, told him that he intended
to run the blockade from the first: The Cornelius, 3 Wall.
Although in suchi cases it is a possible thing that the intention of the
master may have been innocent, the court is under the necessity of acting on the presumption which arises from such conduct, and of inferring
a criminal intent: Id.
RAimoADs.
Powers to Mortgage and issue Bond,.-A railroad corporation is not
authorized by common law to mortgage its franchise, without further
authority than is conferred by its act of incorporation: Commonwealth
v. Smith and Others, 10 Allen.
Corporations have the power bycommon law to issue bonds. But
since St. 1854, c. 286, railroad corporations in this commonwealth have
no power to issue bonds for the payment of money, except for the purposes and in the mode therein authorized; and all bonds issued otherwise
are void, and a mortgage to secure such bonds is also void: Id.
Although a railroad corporation which has issued such invalid bonds
and mortgage does not seek to repudiate them, one who has taken a valid
second mortgage which contains no covenants of warranty, but is not
made expressly subject to the former mortgage, may take advantage of
their invalidity: Id.
Such second mortgagee has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at
law, and therefore cannot maintain a bill in equity to procure the cancellation of the first mortgage, and thus remove a cloud upon his title: Id.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.

Failureto deliver Goods.-If goods are sent by a carrier and neither
the bill of lading nor the direction upon them enables him to deliver
them to the purchaser, and they are lost in consequence, the purchaser
may recover back the price paid by him to the vendor for the same; nor
will he be presumed to have assented to or waived the vendor's omission,
from proof that he received a copy of the imperfect bill of lading before
the payment was made, and that he thereafter made diligent inquiry to
find the goods: _Finn v. Clark, 10 Allen.
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WARRANTY.

Damages for Breach.-The rule of law that the measure of damages
in an action for breach of warranty on the sale of a chattel is the difference between the actual value of the article sold and its value, if it
had been as warranted, is not affected by proof that the purchaser subsequently resold it for an increased price, especially if it does not appear
that such sale by him was without warranty: Brown v. Bigelow, 10
Allen.
A bill of sale of " one horse, sound and kind," is a warranty of soundness, upon which the vendor is liable if the horse proves to be permanently lame, although the purchaser knew that he was lame a week
before the sale, and his lameness was talked of before the sale, and the
vendor then refused to give a warranty: Id.
WATERCOURSE.

Obstructionsto Flowof Water--Joint Action of several Persons-,u.i

against one-Municipal Corporation.-Ifthe rightful flow of the water
of a stream is obstructed by the joint action of several parties, although
not acting in combination or by concert, it is no defence to the maintenance of an action against one of them that all are not joined as defendants; but this objection goes only to the damages: Wheeler v. ft of
Worcester, 10 Allen.

A city is not liable in an action at law for an injury to a private person
by the obstruction of the flow of the water of a stream, caused by an
increase of the surface wash from the streets into the same, if such increase is only the natural result of the growth of the city; or by the
emptyings of the sewers into the same, if these are no greater than
would otherwise have been carried in by surface washings, and are not
sufficient to exert any appreciable effect on such person; or by a bridge
constructed by a railroad corporation, under the authority of its charter;
or by a bridge constructed by the city, if the bridge when built was sufficient to allow the free flow of the water as the stream then was, or with
such changes as were likely to be produced by natural causes alone,
although it has proved insufficient for this purpose, with such changes as
have been produced by the exercise by a railroad corporation of its
chartered rights, or by the wrongful acts of individuals: Id.
WILL.
Proof qf Executon.-A will which bears the genuine signatures of
three competent subscribing witnesses, who signed their names simply
as "witness to signature," with nothing further, may be admitted to
probate, although neither of the two survivors of them recollects anything about the circumstances under which it was executed: Eliot v.
Eliot, 10 Allen.

Executor as Witness.-The executor named in a will is a competent
subscribing witness thereto, and may testify in support thereof, under
the statutes of this commonwealth, although he has not declined the
trust: Wyman and Others v. Symmes, 10 Allen.

